

2. (S) National/Tactical Interface Issues (remarks are keyed to the ques-  
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a. We also perceive that many of the issues associated with the inter-  
face problem are being solved in a serial fashion. The JCS Test Program  
(SM-984) has permitted the identification and solution of some issues.  
Under that Program, Army is actively involved in experimenting with the  
tactical application of national systems. During 1978 the most signifi-  
cant exercises were GRAVITY SCORE and COLDFIRE in Europe. During those  
exercises we saw progressive improvement in the ability of tactical com-  
manders to use products from the national systems.

We also agree that intelligence requirements are becoming more strin-  
gent and that systems costs are increasing with some technological uncer-  
tainities. At the same time the Army's ground warfare problem is becoming  
more complex and the systems more costly.

The Army TENCAP Program is one positive effort to provide tactical  
interface with national intelligence systems. The program has been de-  
layed by not only budgetary limitations, but by Congressional questions,  
e.g., systems survivability, information utility, and assurance of adequate  
communications. The Army's approach has been to build prototype interface  
systems, field these systems and learn from operational experience how to  
best use the national systems. Congressional staffers argue that the  
operational concept must be well defined prior to the fielding of proto-  
type systems.

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In our view the major issue of national/tactical interface is budgeting and priorities. Tasking priority, institutional boundaries, and disagreement over technological feasibility and cost effectiveness are of less significance. Army requires an expensive sensor suite and processing capabilities to meet its intelligence needs. It is recognized that all that is required is not affordable. It then becomes a question of determining sensor mix and sorting out among the various program advocates an affordable way to go. There is competition not only within the Army, but competition between Services and between DOD and other agencies of the Intelligence Community. These systems were not built to respond to the full spectrum of intelligence requirements. In the long term, certain things can be done to provide more general purpose systems or systems better optimized for operational support. The Army is interested in driving future system development toward tasking independence, better geolocation accuracy, more timeliness, and more response access to the area of interest. We realize that the current systems must be applied to the extent that they have capability, but the limitations must be clearly understood, and the gaps must be filled by other systems controlled at the various levels of the national/tactical interface. There are disagreements over technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of various systems approaches. Major study efforts are under way in the Intelligence Community to better understand the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness aspects. Progress is being made, especially in understanding the technical feasibilities of using national instead of tactical systems.

c. We do not believe that tactical commanders, especially those within the alliances of NATO and United Nations Command in Korea, are concerned that national support is the cause of more problems than solutions. Tactical commanders have, however, frequently expressed concern about the problems associated with the nonreleasability to their allied counterparts. Certain provisions for releasability exist for a wartime situation that are difficult to practice in peacetime. One solution for this problem is being approached in the JCS Test Program and is being demanded by the Unified Commands. It is felt, however, that even without progress in the area of releasability, tactical commanders could continue to be served by the provision of US-only information. The overall problem is more political than technical in nature. It can partially be solved through expanded use of simulation and with the establishment of specific procedures for peacetime representation of wartime sanitization authorities. Fundamental change in national disclosure policies is understood to have begun with the issuance of Presidential Directive 37. The implementation of this change is currently being pursued by the responsible committees. This process will require several years to effect. What is required in the interim is the resolve on the part of the Intelligence Community to pursue consensus policies as they are defined. One area of great concern to the Army that would be of immediate benefit and is not in conflict with current national disclosure policy is the treatment of operational electronic intelligence (ELINT) data. 1973 USIB guidance permits decompartmentation of national ELINT within certain guidelines. Nonrelease caveats have been added by agencies concerned with Second and Third party agreements and other extreme security concerns.

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d. Our general observations about the major needs versus the usability trade-off to determine the volume of national intelligence designated to the lower tactical echelons focus principally on the capabilities of current communications. Without communication saturation and queing at communications nodes, the communications loading imposed by national intelligence is only a hypothetical problem. Given the capability to receive all of the intelligence that can currently be processed and forwarded by national systems, we believe that tactical echelons can deal with the volume through manual sorting and identification of priority elements of various reports. Experimentation has shown that relatively simple automatic processing also will quickly solve most of the problem associated with volume, except the communications saturation. The problem with communication saturation is most serious at echelons below corps. Above corps, the problem is associated with the cost of the establishment of communications links and the priority of transmission of various kinds of command and control information. When the volume of intelligence data is clearly understood, tactical commands will assign the appropriate priority to its transmission. The Army learned during BOLD EAGLE 1976 that volume was not as serious a problem as it may at first appear. A specific example was at the Air Force Forces Headquarters. Only one officer was required to screen electronic reports on the order of 2,000 intercepts per day. On the surface, this would appear to be clearly beyond manual processing capability. However, this officer consulted with the command element and processed only those intercepts dealing with one or two classes of electronic emitters, ignoring 90 percent of the received volume. It was evaluated that the 10 percent of the information processed in this manner significantly added to the command's combat capability and that the unprocessed 90 percent did not seriously detract from the command's ability to operate. This approach to solving the volume problem was apparently a function of the training and management capacity of the officer in charge.

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for the record!*

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